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Abstract 
In this paper we develop some new models for the prediction of failure in the UK that 
add to the literature by showing that “dynamic logit” models that incorporate market 
variables of the form developed by Chava and Jarrow (2004) and Campbell et al 
(2008) add considerable power to pure accounting-based models.   Importantly, we 
extend the logic of Campbell et al (2008) by showing that incorporating macro-
economic variables adds predictive power, both in and out-of-sample, to market-based 
accounting models.  Last, we show that adding industry controls gives a modest 
improvement to such models for UK firms in the case of a models based on 
accounting, market and economic variables, but a greater improvement in terms of a 
pure accounting based model. 
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 Some New Models for Corporate Failure Prediction in the 
UK 
 
Introduction 
Several recent papers have served to emphasise the need for a timely model of UK 
financial failure prediction, the parameters of which are fully in the public domain.  
First, Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) show that financially distressed firms 
have delivered anomalously low returns in the US.  There is no UK equivalent to the 
model they use to estimate distress risk, something we attempt to address in this 
paper.  Second, Pope (2010) suggests that factor mimicking portfolios based on 
financial distress risk may help deliver more powerful factor models of expected 
returns.  In respect of the UK, this suggestion pre-supposes that an appropriate model 
is available.  Of course, with regard to the latter one can make the case for using a 
model that is well-understood, such as the z-score models of Taffler (1983, 1984) and 
this is precisely the approach followed in Agarwal and Taffler (2008a), which 
provides some fascinating evidence that momentum may be a proxy for distress risk.  
However, in doing so it provides UK evidence that is consistent with the Campbell et 
al (2008) finding, leaving the conundrum that markets, apparently, do not adequately 
price distress risk.  This alone motivates the search for a “better” distress prediction 
model that might resolve this anomaly.  Third, Agarwal and Taffler (2007) note the 
dramatic increase in UK firms with “at risk” z-scores from 1997 onwards, which 
might imply the need for an updated UK prediction model.  Fourth, Shumway (2001) 
shows that a “hazard” or “dynamic logit” model gives better predictive power than a 
simpler logit model.  Chava and Jarrow (2004) develop this further by adding industry 
controls, and show that such a model can easily be estimated using standard statistical 
packages.  As far as we are aware, these approaches to modelling, combined with the 
Campbell et al (2008) innovations, have not been attempted in the UK. However, in 
the current financial climate one scarcely needs to allude to the academic literature to 
justify an interest in a timely measure of failure prediction – the likely interest from 
the wider community in such a model is, regrettably, all too obvious. 
 
In this paper, we do not devote a great deal of time to  the discussion of the long 
earlier literature on corporate failure prediction and research methods, given a review 
can be found in Balcaen and Ooghe (2006).  The basic choice in models is between 
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what Balcaen and Ooghe (2006) term the “classic” statistical methodologies, by 
which they mean univariate and multivariate models that use accounting numbers, and 
what Agarwal and Taffler (2008b) term market-based models, a classification which 
encompasses a range of contingent claims models.  We specifically do not use this 
latter approach in this paper, as Agarwal and Taffler (2008b) show that it fails to out-
perform a simple z-score model.  Furthermore, Campbell et al (2008) conclude that a 
variant of the option-based approach, a distance to default model, does not adequately 
summarise default risk for US firms.  So instead, we focus on developing market and 
accounting-based models in the spirit of Campbell et al (2008).   
 
It is worth pausing to consider the theoretical justification for combining accounting 
and market data.  One can, of course, criticise accounting-based models in general for 
lacking theoretical underpinnings, although Agarwal and Taffler (2007, p.298) make a 
reasonable counter-argument to this.  Suppose one is prepared to accept that the use of 
accounting data can be justified by theory.  There is, nonetheless, an issue of 
timeliness.  Accounting data is necessarily out of date and added to this, distressed 
firms tend to be late reporting (e.g. Ohlson 1980; Lennox 1999).  In such 
circumstances, combining accounting data with information in market prices may 
help overcome the timeliness problem.  Beaver et al (2005) make a not dissimilar 
point and note that (p.110) “market prices reflect a rich and comprehensive mix of 
information, which includes financial statement data as a subset”.  The particular 
market variables we consider here, following Campbell et al (2008), are the 
replacement of book values of assets with market values, together with six-month 
excess returns and standard deviation of returns.  Note that this does not imply 
financial statement information is of limited value, as we show that accounting 
measures of profitability, cash flow and liabilities have an important role to play in 
financial distress prediction.  However, an interesting characteristic of these enhanced 
models is that once market information is incorporated, simple accounting measures 
based on changes in income and dummy variables for loss-making firms are rendered 
irrelevant.  This is particularly interesting given the fact that Agarwal and Taffler 
(2007, p.297) highlight the problems caused by the increase in loss-making firms.  
Finally, as we show that these enhanced models out-perform pure accounting-based 
models of the form investigated in Agarwal and Taffler (2007; 2008b), the 
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implication is that these models should out-perform contingent claims based models, 
although we do not formally investigate this. 
 
Several recent developments in the literature have involved the use of “hazard” or 
“dynamic logit” models, of the form first developed by Shumway (2001).  He shows 
that single period logit models are mis-specified, leading to inference errors, and that 
his “hazard” model improves on a single-period logit model by explicitly accounting 
for time.  Furthermore, he shows that such models can be estimated by standard logit 
programs in a simple and intuitive way (Shumway, 2001, p.111-112).  Chava and 
Jarrow (2004) develop this further and show that the process is even simpler than 
Shumway (2001) suggests. 
 
It is worth emphasising that none of these recent developments appears in the UK 
literature. Specifically with regard to the UK the earliest studies are due to Taffler 
(1982, 1983).  Taffler (1984) provides a critical review of the outstanding features of 
the Z-score models documented in the UK. While a few studies in the U.S. find price 
level-adjusted ratios add incremental information over and above that provided by 
historic cost ratios (Ketz, 1978; Mensah, 1983), Keasey and Watson (1986) find that 
the current cost information does not improve the predictive accuracy of the models 
for small firms in the U.K. Peel, Peel, and Pope (1986) appears to be the earliest 
attempt to apply a logit-based analysis in the UK.   Keasey and Watson (1991) 
conduct a detailed review of the usefulness of U.K. financial distress prediction 
models in a management context and show that an improvement in the predictive 
power might be primarily driven by the inclusion of more years of information.   
Lennox (1999) finds that profitability, leverage, and cash flow have important effects 
on the probability of bankruptcy on a sample of 90 bankrupt firms. Logit and probit 
models are found to perform better than MDA approaches in his study. His 
bankruptcy model shows a decline in accuracy for more distant bankruptcy horizons.  
Charitou et al (2004) employ a logit analysis and a neural networks methodology and 
use a dataset of 51 matched pairs of failed and non-failed firms. The information 
content of operating cash flow is found to add incremental discriminatory power to 
the prediction of UK company failure.  Agarwal and Taffler (2007) adopt an 
altogether different approach, and run a logit model based upon the original Taffler 
(1983) z-score model, which they contrast with a loss-making firm predictive model. 
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We start with a simple “pure” accounting based model along the lines proposed in 
Shumway (2001).  Even though we show that we can improve upon that, by bringing 
in market-based values following Campbell et al (2008), we believe that such a model 
may have utility to those researching distress prediction in unlisted companies.  For 
example, Peel and Peel (1987) investigate private company failure on a data set of 
194 large UK industrial private companies. These firms are derived from the Extel 
Unquoted Companies Service which contains the information on the 2100 largest 
private companies in the UK with reference to turnover, a measure which is hardly 
representative of small firms in general. Their findings demonstrate that qualitative 
variables, such as the lag in accounts submission, have significant incremental 
information content and improve the prediction result. Such a model also facilitates 
comparison with earlier accounting-based UK models. 
 
We go on to examine the impact of adopting market-defined values, as in Campbell et 
al (2008), and show that this leads to significant improvements in predictive power, 
both in-sample and out-of-sample, over the pure accounting model.  We argue that it 
should be possible to improve such models further by incorporating macro-economic 
variables, and indeed show that that is the case.  Last, we examine the impact of 
specifying industry level models.  Chava and Jarrow (2004) show, that as would be 
intuitively expected, industry effects are important in predicting bankruptcy.  When 
we include such effects we see a modest improvement in performance from so doing 
in the accounting, market and economic models, but a more significant improvement 
in the pure accounting model. 
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Research method and data 
We employ the “hazard”, or “dynamic logit” model of Shumway (2001), Chava and 
Jarrow (2004) and Campbell et al (2008).  As the latter acknowledge, this is a 
relatively atheoretical econometric approach.  Whilst more theoretical approaches are 
available (for a summary see Christidis, 2010, Ch.2) the result is a fairly powerful 
model that uses publicly available data.  We try and avoid problems of data mining by 
only employing variables found to be relevant in the previous literature, rather than 
adopting a “kitchen sink” approach, but also supplement the accounting variables by 
including macro-economic variables which theory would suggest should be relevant 
to predicting distress. 
 
Specifically, we are interested in the most extreme form of financial distress, 
corporate failure.  Of course, we acknowledge that our particular definition of 
financial distress suffers from being somewhat arbitrary (Keasey and Watson, 1991; 
Balcaen and Ooghe, 2006), and that other forms of distress are worthy of study.  As 
Agarwal and Taffler (2007, p.288) note, there are alternative events, such as 
restructurings, that can result in severer losses to equity holders and debt holders.  
However, we follow them in selecting measures of insolvency that are “clean”.  For 
our purposes, we define failure as one of the following types of death classified in the 
London Share Price Database (LSPD): (1) Suspension or cancellation with share 
acquired later (2) Liquidation (usually valueless, but there may be liquidation 
payments) (3) Quotation suspended - if suspended for more than three years, this may 
lead to automatic cancellation (4) Voluntary liquidation, where value remains and 
was/is being distributed (5) Receiver appointed/liquidation. Probably valueless, but 
not yet certain (6) in Administration or administrative receivership (7) Cancelled and 
assumed valueless. 
 
Our sample consists of most liquidations and receiverships that occurred in the U.K. 
between 1978 and 2006 among publicly listed companies. For ease of exposition, we 
refer to firms that go into receivership or are liquidated by the shorthand of 
“bankrupt” firms, although legally in the UK whilst individuals can go “bankrupt” 
limited companies cannot.  Whilst some may view such shorthand as irredeemably 
sloppy, nonetheless “bankruptcy” is a convenient term that is internationally 
understood.  The total number of bankruptcies included in this expanded database is 
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589 initially.  Our total number of non-bankrupt firm-years is 49,063 and our average 
“bankruptcy” rate is 1.19%.  We include listed firms from all industries, with the 
exception of banks, insurance companies and investment trusts, while retaining all 
other general financial companies in the finance sector which differentiates our study 
from others that commonly use only industrial firms. We also exclude secondary 
stocks of existing firms and foreign stocks. We include Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM) companies in our study. We exclude Investment or Financial Trusts as they are 
often voluntarily liquidated after a few years or terminated upon agreement.  A 
summary of the number of events for each category is given in Table 1. The sample 
is, we believe, by far the largest sample of such events in any UK study.  For 
example, Agarwal and Taffler (2007) have 232 firm years matched with a sample of 
27,011 non-failed firms. 
 
Chava and Jarrow (2004, p.546-8) show that under non-informative censoring
1
, a 
standard logistic model of the form: 
itt
i
t XP exp1/1  
where itX  are the time-varying co-ordinates (accounting, market and macro-
economic variables), can be estimated.  We estimate our models using the logistic 
regression function in Stata.  
 
In setting up the model, we follow Chava and Jarrow (2004) and set the dependent 
variable equal to one in the year of liquidation and to zero otherwise. A firm 
contributes an observation in the estimation equation for each year from the firm‟s 
Start Date, taken from the LSPD, until the end of the observation period or until it 
dies. A firm that is delisted for any reason other than those listed in Table 1 (e.g. it is 
acquired) would contribute observations until the delisting year. The liquidation year 
is defined as the calendar year of the Death Event Date as given in LSPD. For firms 
that go into liquidation within three months of their fiscal year-end, it is assumed that 
the most recent year‟s financial statements are not available and the prior fiscal year is 
defined as the year before bankruptcy.  We find that the average lead time between 
the date of the fiscal year of the last relevant report and bankruptcy is quite long, 
                                                 
1
 “Non-informative” means that the censoring point (e.g. due to a firm disappearing from the dataset 
because of a merger) is independent of the failure point. 
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approximately thirteen to fifteen months.  Lennox (1999) also found that the average 
length of time between the final annual report of a failing company and its entry into 
bankruptcy is fourteen months, which is consistent with the findings of Citron and 
Taffler (1992), and Agarwal and Taffler (2007).  Schwartz and Menon (1985) suggest 
that failing firms are likely to delay the submission of their accounts.  Keasey and 
Watson (1988) also find that it is not uncommon for the accounts relating to the 2-3 
years prior to bankruptcy never to be produced or to be unavailable after bankruptcy 
occurs.  
 
Beaver (1966) adopted the use of financial ratios in bankruptcy prediction and 
established that they have predictive power up to at least five years prior to 
bankruptcy. Previous studies show that the bankruptcy prediction models generally 
focus on areas such as profitability, liquidity, cash flow generation, and leverage.  
Some researchers (Argenti, 1976; Slatter, 1984) have identified a number of 
symptoms of decline that can be picked up from a company‟s financial statements. 
These may include declining profitability, decreasing sales at a constant price, 
increased borrowing, a decline in liquidity, a cut in dividends to conserve cash, the 
use of creative accounting, changes in auditor, increasing delays before accounts are 
published, rapid management turnover, declining market share, lack of planning, and 
a paralysis of management decision making. 
 
Beaver et al (2005) emphasise that when selecting predictor variables, one should take 
into account the development of accounting standards, the increase in the relative 
importance of intangible assets and financial derivatives, and the perceived increase in 
the degree of discretion entering financial statements. Keasey & Watson (1991) also 
suggest that the models based on data from earlier time periods need to be used with 
care, as there is an extensive institutional change in the early period. In the UK, for 
example, the 1980s was a decade when a number of important changes took place, 
such as financial deregulation, an upsurge in corporate restructuring activities, such as 
buy-outs, privatizations, mergers, takeovers, etc, and the passing of the 1986 
Insolvency and Disqualification of Director Acts.  Taffler (1982) also suggests that 
the dramatic changes in the UK economy and major changes in the system of 
company taxation would highlight the need to monitor the performance of the models 
continuously to ensure that reasonable degrees of population stationarity and stability 
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in the underlying relationships continue to hold.  We deal with this issue by 
conducting out-of-sample tests for each of our models.  If changes of the nature 
discussed pose a problem for UK models, then we should see poor out-of-sample 
predictive power when we use earlier periods to predict later periods.  In fact, it 
appears that the inclusion of market variables and economic variables is capable of 
overcoming any difficulties posed by such environmental and accounting standard 
changes. 
 
Selection of candidates for predictive variables 
A careful selection of predictor variables is needed, not only to improve the predictive 
performance of bankruptcy prediction models (Karels ad Prakash, 1987), but also to 
ensure that our variable selection process is guided by theory. We first group the 
accounting variables into a number of categories, and explain why these categories 
are selected.  We then present summary statistics on those variables found to have the 
best predictive power in Tables 2 and 3. 
Liquidity 
Liquidity reflects the ability of the firm to meet its short term commitments and the 
potential to generate working capital funds. (i.e. current ratio, working capital/total 
assets). The ratios would be expected to be critical immediately prior to failure, since 
only liquid assets can generate cash to cover obligations. Over the long-run, firms 
may try to minimise liquidity in order to channel funds into productive assets. Over-
commitment of funds to investment or inadequate anticipation of upcoming needs for 
liquidity may easily precipitate a crisis (Zavgren, 1985).  The quick or acid test ratio 
is applied to examine whether a company has adequate cash or cash equivalents to 
meet its current obligations without having to resort to liquidating non-cash assets 
such as stocks.  
Profitability 
Most studies suggest that profitability has important influence, since companies with 
low profitability are likely to become less liquid and more highly geared (Morris, 
1997). We initially choose variables to reflect the strength of the company‟s 
profitability at different stages of its earning process, such as net income, earnings 
before interest and tax, and retained earnings. This helps to identify whether the 
earnings are sensitive to changes in a firm‟s operating health. Gupta (1983) shows that 
almost every company failure has been preceded by a period of impairment of 
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earnings. When earnings are impaired, the supply of funds also soon dries up, 
affecting both working capital for current operations and long-term capital for growth.  
Taffler (1982) showed that profitability and financial leverage have a higher 
contribution in predicting financial distress, whereas the lack of working capital and 
short-term liquidity are of less importance in magnitude to liabilities and earnings 
abilities.  
Cash flow 
Although cash flow reporting has been recognised as important in the UK in the past 
decade, an examination of the existing UK failure literature reveals that operating 
cash flow variables have not been yet been widely examined in UK insolvency 
models. Prior US studies provided some evidence that operating cash flow-related 
variables may add to the explanatory power of bankruptcy prediction models (Casey 
and Bartczak, 1984 and Gentry et al, 1985).  Beaver (1966) carried out a univariate 
study of 30 ratios and concluded that cash flow to total debt is the best single ratio 
predictor. Lennox (1999) suggested that default on debt servicing often increases the 
chance of bankruptcy, especially if the firm does not have relatively easy access to 
internal or external finance. This reflects a higher likelihood of a firm to go bankrupt 
if it has cash flow problems, compared to a firm which has easier access to its internal 
finance. 
Leverage 
The long term financial position of the firm is reflected in its leverage, which 
determines the ability of the firm to meet its debts in the long run and the ability to 
raise new capital through borrowing (i.e. total liabilities/total assets, long-term 
debt/net capital employed). A major concern is whether the firm can service its debts 
or generate enough profit to be able to pay the interest on its loans. Leverage ratios 
measure the extent to which the assets are covered by liabilities and the extent to 
which assets can depreciate in value and still meet its commitments with regard to 
external debt or borrowed funds. If the firm is heavily dependent on borrowed funds, 
profits will be high during years of growing profitability, but in a bad year, they will 
be low or negative. Leverage ratios therefore indicate the level of financial risk in 
addition to the business risk a firm might face. 
Activity and Company Characteristics 
Activity ratios measure how effectively a firm is exploiting its assets. They could also 
indicate whether a firm is keeping adequate levels of assets, which could in turn affect 
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its performance in the long run. Some other activity ratios related to creditors and 
debtors indicate the effectiveness of a company‟s credit policies, the demand for its 
products and can also reflect to an extent whether the firm is having difficulties in 
meeting its obligations. Company characteristics, such as size and age, could identify 
the strength and weakness of the firms to survive through the different phases of their 
business cycle. 
Market Variables 
Prior research has examined the ability of variables based on market values to predict 
bankruptcy (Hillegeist et al, 2004, Chava and Jarrow, 2005, Shumway, 2001). Market 
price is a useful indicator that incorporates the information learnt from financial 
statement data released by the firm as well as other information available in the 
market. Rees (1995) provides support for the idea that market price can be a valuable 
predictor of failure, even if it is influenced by other factors. He suggests that market 
price not only reflects a wide variety of information related to the expected future 
cash flows but it also reveals a subset of information about the likelihood of 
liquidation and cash flow impact. Thus, a sharp fall in the market price or unusual 
market-based ratios might be viewed as a warning.  The large body of empirical 
evidence implies that incorporating market data into the models is likely to provide 
substantial benefits, particularly with respect to timeliness of information (Keasey and 
Watson, 1991). In the UK, full accounting data are only available annually with 
interim financials available semi-annually, but only quarterly in some limited cases. 
Market price variables give more timely information and also provide a direct 
measure of volatility. The market-based variable most typically used in prior research 
is the firm size measured by market capitalisation.  
 
Beaver et al (2005) suggest that the probability of bankruptcy may be embedded in 
the market price, even though it may not be a direct measure of that probability. They 
note that (p.110) “as the probability of bankruptcy increases, the nonlinear nature of 
the payoff function for the security becomes increasingly more important because of 
risky debt and limited liability”.  Hillegeist et al (2004) argue that the conservatism 
principle in accounting methods might cause asset values to be understated relative to 
their market values, particularly for assets and intangibles. They conclude that (p.6) 
“downward-biased asset valuation might cause measures of accounting-based 
leverage to be overstated”. Beaver et al (2005) point out that the market-to-book ratios 
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may also serve as a crude approximation of the relative importance of intangible 
assets, which has gradually increased over time as research and development 
expenditures have become important in technology-based firms. 
 
Many recent studies have introduced the measure of asset volatility as another crucial 
variable in bankruptcy prediction. Hillegeist et al (2004) suggest that volatility 
captures the likelihood that the value of the firm‟s assets will decline to such an extent 
that the firm will not be able to repay its debts. The probability of bankruptcy is 
perceived to increase with volatility. Two firms with identical leverage ratios may 
have substantially different probability of bankruptcy depending on their asset 
volatilities.  Lys (1984) found that when the leverage ratio is used as a single proxy 
for financial risk, volatility becomes important and is highly correlated with the 
leverage ratio. Campbell et al (2001) also point out that the absence of any volatility 
measure in the accounting-based models is likely to lead to a substantial reduction in 
their performance, as firms exhibit considerable cross-sectional variation in volatility.  
 
Economic variables: 
Whilst it seems intuitive to include macro-economic variables in a bankruptcy 
prediction model, one can reasonably argue that such variables should be redundant in 
a model that incorporates market price information, as market values should fully 
embed all available information.  However, it is possible that leading indicators can 
add to information in prices insofar as market prices reflect expected cash flows and 
discount rates, whilst economic variables may tell us something about downside risk, 
which is of key importance in bankruptcy prediction models.  We employ the market 
timing variables proposed by Gregory (2000) as the economic indicators in our 
model. The change in the return of FTSE All Share Index over the previous twelve 
months (DMKT) is employed as the first business cycle variable. As the levels of 
interest rates and inflation rates in the economy are likely to affect the firm 
differentially according to its choice of financing method, we incorporate a proxy for 
interest rates (TBR) into the model represented by the nominal three-month Treasury 
Bill Rate. The monthly change in Retail Price Index is also incorporated as a measure 
of the inflation rate (INFL). An inverted yield curve can be useful recession indicator, 
so we include the term structure premium, which is the difference between long-term 
gilt rate and Treasury Bill Rate (LONGSHT). Two direct measures of economic 
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activity are also used. The first is the 12-month change in the UK Long Leading 
Indicator published by the National Statistics Office (CUKLEAD). The second is the 
monthly change in the Industrial Production Index (INDPROD). All the raw data 
required for the calculation of the variables are obtained from Datastream and LSPD. 
As an alternative measure of interest rates, we calculate a deflated Treasury Bill rate, 
(DEFLTBR).  However, our analysis shows that only interest rate variables and 
inflation, in conjunction with INDPROD add explanatory power to the models based 
upon accounting and market variables. 
 
Following the procedure suggested by Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2003) and 
Campbell et al (2008), we also adjust the book values of assets to eliminate outliers. 
We add 10% of the difference between market and book equity to the book value of 
total assets. This leads to an increase of book values that are extremely small, which 
may not be properly measured and may generate outliers when used as the 
denominators of financial ratios.  We calculate the monthly log excess return on each 
firm‟s equity relative to the FTSE All Share Index (EXRET), the standard deviation 
of each firm‟s monthly stock return over the past six months (SIGMA), and the 
relative size of each firm measured as the log ratio of its market capitalization to that 
of the FTSE All Share Index (RSIZE). We also take each firm‟s price per share from 
LSPD (PRICE).  We attempt to further limit the influence of outliers by Winsorising 
all the variables in our model at the 5
th
 and 95
th
 percentiles of their pooled 
distributions across all firm-year observations. We replace any observation below the 
5
th
 percentile with the 5
th
 percentile, and any observation above the 95
th
 percentile 
with the 95
th
 percentile. This adjustment also applies to those firms whose book 
equity has been adjusted as above. 
 
From the potential candidate list, an extensive univariate analysis
2
 and the testing of 
alternative logit models, we end up with the following list of variables which we 
include in the first logistic regression, “the accounting model”: working capital over 
total assets (WCTA); total liabilities over total assets (TLTA); cash flow over total 
assets (CFTA); change in net income (CHIN); following Ohlson (1980), a dummy 
variable equal to one if net income was negative for the last two years (INTWO); 
                                                 
2
 Not reported here for reasons of space, but available from the authors on request. 
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earnings before interest and tax over share capital (EBITSHARE); quick assets over 
current assets (QACA); and funds from operation over total liabilities (FOPTL).  For 
the accounting model we end up with a sample of 558 bankrupt firms for which we 
can obtain sufficient information to calculate all the above variables. Summary 
statistics on these variables are presented in Table 2.  We show separately the 
characteristics of liquidated, non-liquidated and acquired firms, as a number of 
previous studies (Shrieves and Stevens 1979; Pastena and Ruland 1986; Peel and 
Wilson 1989; and Peel 1990) have examined the possibility of a merger/bankruptcy 
alternative to financial distressed firms. Their studies indicated that a significantly 
large minority of merged firms, around 15-17 percent, exhibited symptoms of 
financial distress in the year prior to merger compared to the general population of 
firms, where less than 5 percent were defined as distressed. Peel (1990) suggested that 
it is usually the distressed firms which actively seek a partner. 
 
Panel A of Table 2 describes the distribution of the variables in the entire dataset, 
panel B describes the properties of the bankrupt group, panel C describes the non-
bankrupt group, and panel D describes the firms that were either merged or acquired. 
A comparison between panel A and B reveals that firms that go into liquidation have 
some differences from the rest of the sample which are intuitive. All the explanatory 
variables appear to have a lower and poorer performance in the liquidated group 
compared to other groups. The liquidity of the bankrupt firms, as reflected in the 
working capital ratio WCTA, is significantly lower than the non-bankrupt firms. The 
mean value for liquidated firms is only 7.1%, while for the non-liquidated firms it is 
17%. The median is also has a much lower at only 3.9%. The value of the TLTA is 
fairly high relative to the assets with the average leverage at 61.8% and the median 
leverage in excess of 66%.  Liquidated firms appear to experience negative cash flows 
and a greater propensity to have negative earnings in consecutive years prior to 
bankruptcy. Funds flow and profitability measures are also significantly negative, for 
example FOPTL is -14.1% as compared to 24.7% in the acquired group and 17.6% in 
the non-liquidated group. EBITSHARE is also negative for the liquidated group but 
positive for the rest of the sample. The acquired firms group has stronger cash flow 
and profitability components despite the slightly lower liquidity in quick asset and 
working capital compared to the rest of the non-liquidated firms.  The standard 
deviation of the explanatory variables is consistently higher in the bankrupt group 
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compared to the rest, whereas those of the acquired group are consistently lower 
across all the variables.  
 
Table 3 displays the characteristics of the variables for the market and accounting-
based model.  Missing price or returns data mean that the sample for this analysis is 
limited to 428 bankrupt firms.  Variables are: total liabilities over market value of 
equity (TLME); log excess return over  FTSE All Share Index (EXRET); cash flow 
over market value of total assets calculated by addition of firm market value and book 
value of total liabilities (CFMTA);  standard deviation of firm stock returns over the 
previous six-month period (SIGMA); price per share (PRICE); net income over 
market value of total assets (NIMTA); total liabilities over adjusted total assets 
calculated by adding 10% of the difference between market equity and book equity 
(TLTADJ); and log of firm‟s market equity over the total valuation of FTSE All Share 
Index (RSIZE).  Again we see that the bankrupt firms have a relatively much higher 
leverage. The value of their debts is extremely high compared to the market value of 
equity or the total adjusted assets value. The average TLME is 2.542 as compared to 
0.999 for non-bankrupt firms, including acquired firms. The bankrupt firms typically 
make losses and have a mean net income of -5.6% relative to the market value of their 
assets.  The bankrupt firms also experience negative excess returns with a mean value 
of -14.5%, which is close to the median value of -14.9%.  The bankrupt firms 
typically have a much lower price per share. The mean price per share is only 24p for 
bankrupt firms, while the median price per share is only 7p. The firm size is also 
smaller than that of the non-bankrupt firms. Their volatility has a mean six-month 
SIGMA of 25.5% and a median SIGMA of 22.3%, which are considerably higher 
than the rest of the sample. 
 
Table 4 summarises the variables for the accounting, market, and economic-based 
model (henceforth the AME model). Variable values for the market and accounting 
based variables are as Table 3 values.  We can see that bankruptcy seems to be 
associated with times when the economic outlook is unfavourable, as proxied by the 
yield curve, with a mean LONGSHT of -0.25%, whereas non-bankruptcy is 
associated with a LONGSHT value of 0.127%.  LONGSHT is higher still for the 
acquired firm group at 0.182%. INFL remains at a similar level with mean and 
median close to 0.44% across the groups. However, there is a slightly higher monthly 
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inflation rate amongst the failed firm group. TBR seems to be fairly stable across the 
groups with a mean of 8.2% and a median of 7.0%. The bankrupt group has a higher 
mean of 8.4%, a similar median, and a higher standard deviation. However, the 
acquired firm group has a higher mean of 9.2% and a median of 9.4%.  
 
Results 
The results from running the logistic regressions for each of our models are presented 
in Tables 5-7.  We start with the pure accounting model, which as we note above 
requires no market data and may, therefore, be applicable to unlisted firms (although 
we stress that we do not test it on such firms).  
Table 5 reports the logistic regression results for this accounting model. Eight 
variables are found to be significant at the 1% level and all have the expected sign: 
WCTA, TLTA, CFTA, CHIN, INTWO, EBITSHARE, QACA, and FOPTL. These 
variables reflect a combination of different aspects of the firm‟s health which can be 
used to predict bankruptcy. Profitability is clearly important category with three 
significant variables (CHIN, INTWO and EBITSHARE). It is followed by liquidity 
with two variables (WCTA and QACA), cash flow and funds-flow (CFTA and 
FOPTL), and leverage as measured by TLTA. 
Five variables from the Ohlson‟s (1980) O-score model are found to be significant in 
our accounting model. One of them is WCTA, which has been found to be highly 
significant in a number of bankruptcy studies and is one of the main variables in 
Altman‟s used Z-score model. TLTA has a positive sign, showing that higher leverage 
leads to a higher risk of bankruptcy. The negative sign of CHIN and positive sign of 
INTWO indicate that the deteriorating losses in past earnings lead to a greater 
likelihood of financial distress. The negative sign of FOPTL also indicates that lower 
funds provided by operations to cover the total debts increase the chances of 
bankruptcy. QACA has a weak correlation to WTCA and acts as an indicator of the 
firm‟s short term financial stability, assessing whether the firm can convert assets into 
cash fairly easily in the immediate near future if any financial needs arise. 
EBITSHARE has a negative sign and shows that the declining earning ability of the 
firm before its interest and tax obligations as compared to the value of the firm equity 
give a signal that the firm might be in trouble. Lastly, CFTA raises the firm‟s 
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attention to its cash flow generating ability even in time when the firm has fair 
profitability performance. 
We check the collinearity diagnostics for all these variables since high correlation 
might lead to imprecise estimates of the regression coefficients or increasing standard 
errors, thus compromising to some extent the tests of significance. All the variables 
have a low variance inflation factor (VIF) and high tolerance. However, whilst the 
model is statistically significant, and the area under the ROC (Receiver Operating 
Characteristics) curve is a reasonable 81.24%
3
, the Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) χ2 
test (hereafter the HL test) for goodness-of-fit suggests that the model does not fit the 
data well.
4
  This further motivates the use of market and/or macro-economic 
variables. 
The Accounting and Market Model 
We replace the traditional accounting ratios NITA and TLTA that use the book value 
of assets with the market-based series from Campbell et al (2008). These measures are 
more sensitive to new information about firm prospects since equity values are 
measured using monthly market data rather than annual accounting data. Despite the 
fact that the market-to-book ratio is significant in the univariate analysis, it is not 
significant in the multivariate model, in contrast to the findings of Campbell et al 
(2008). Accordingly, we try estimating an alternative model, the Accounting and 
Market Model (1).  In this model, we employ both the book value of total liabilities to 
market value of equity (TLME) and liabilities to total adjusted assets (TLTADJ), both 
of which turn out to be highly significant. The correlation between TLME and 
TLTADJ is 0.3055 which is within acceptable bounds. The first measures the total 
leverage over market value of equity, while the second measures the leverage relative 
to the total adjusted assets employed by the firm (at market values for the equity 
element). The likelihood test between the full model and restricted model, in which 
either TLME or TLTADJ is dropped, shows that keeping both variables gives a better 
                                                 
3
 A useful discussion of ROC curves can be found in Agarwal and Taffler (2008b). 
4
 In this respect, note that although Agarwal and Taffler (2007) do not report HL test results, their z-
score model is capable of generating some extreme predictions.  As they note (p. 288-289) their model 
predicts the percentage of firms “at risk” (i.e. with negative z-scores) ranges from 14% in 1979 to a 
peak of 43% in 2002.  The actual percentage of firms that failed in those two years in our sample was 
1.27% and 2.55% respectively.  This suggests their model is capable of generating a very high Type II 
error rate. 
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prediction. The rest of the market variables in Campbell et al‟s (2008) model enter the 
logit regression with the expected sign and are highly statistically significant at the 
1% level, although RSIZE is only significant at the 5% level. A negative sign on 
EXRET shows that firms earning lower returns than the market return have a higher 
risk of going bankrupt, and the coefficient on SIGMA shows that high volatility is 
associated with an increased probability of bankruptcy. Firms with a lower market 
price per share and a smaller market capitalisation relative to the market are more 
likely to go bankrupt. Finally, NIMTA has a significant negative coefficient, 
suggesting that a low level of profitability measured relative to market values of total 
assets is an indicator of financial distress. 
In the second Accounting and Market Model (2), the book-to-market ratio enters as 
significant variable when we include the WCMTA ratio, which was also significant in 
the pure Accounting Model in book value terms. As would be expected, the sign of 
the coefficient on WCMTA is negative. The coefficient on the book-to-market ratio is 
consistent with “value” stocks having a higher probability of going bankrupt. The 
correlation of both ratios to the rest of the variables remains low, apart from the 
correlation between the book-to-market ratio and TLMTA, which is 0.5712, an 
acceptable tolerance level. 
 
It is clear that the predictability of the models improves as we add market and market-
adjusted variables into the model. The R-squared improves significantly from 12.73% 
to approximately 25% in both market variable based models and the area under the 
ROC curve also increase from 81.24% to 89.92% and 89.61% in models 1 and 2 
respectively.  Testing the differences between the two Market Models, a likelihood 
ratio tests show that the second Market Model does not have superior predictive 
ability, as does a simple comparison of the R-squared and area under ROC curve 
figures.  The HL tests show that both models fit the data well.   
The effects of adding macro-economic variables 
In Table 7, we report results from two logit regressions with the inclusion of macro-
economic variables, our AME Models.  For comparison, we repeat the results from 
our marginally-preferred accounting and market model (Model 1) in the first two 
columns of the Table.  We can see that the inclusion of economic variables slightly 
 19 
changes the candidate market and accounting variables, with TLMTA being preferred 
as the measure of leverage rather than TLME and TLTADJ.  Coefficients change 
slightly for the common variables, with most generally having stronger explanatory 
power. In AME Model 1, the yield curve measure (LONGSHT) and the Treasury Bill 
and Inflation rate are significant predictors of distress, whereas in AME Model 2 the 
real interest rate replaces the Treasury Bill rate as a significant predictor (albeit only 
at the 10% level) and decreases in the Industrial Production variable predict distress.  
Compared to the Accounting and Market Model, the R-squared of the AME Model 
(1) improves from 25.33% to 26.22% and the ROC curve area increases from 89.92% 
to 90.34%. A likelihood ratio test confirms a highly significant increase at the 1% 
level in the predictive ability of the model relative to the Accounting and Market 
Model.  Our second AME Model (2) also records a highly significant increase in 
predictive power relative to the Accounting and Market Model, although ROC area 
under the curve and R-squared statistics are marginally lower than those from Model 
1.  HL statistics confirm that both models have good predictive abilities. 
 
In Table 8, we re-estimate the model after excluding 30 observations with unusual 
residuals.  We identify the observations that fit poorly and those that have a great deal 
of influence on the values of the estimated parameters by utilising the regression 
diagnostics (Pregibon, 1981) and graphical analysis suggested in Hosmer and 
Lemeshow (2000, p.177-180). These are plotted by utilising the predict residuals, hat, 
dbeta and dx2 options within Stata.  Of course, one can object to such a process on 
the grounds that it involves another layer of “data snooping”, but several of the 
companies involved were clearly unusual and some had a certain notoriety (to name 
but two, British and Commonwealth Holdings; Maxwell Communications). The first 
effect is to change the significance of some of the macro variables.  In AME Model 1, 
INFL is now only significant at the 10% level.  In AME Model 2, the deflated interest 
rate measure now becomes significant at the 5% rather than the 10% level.  Both 
models and the Accounting and Market Model show a substantial improvement in the 
explanatory power of the sample.   
 
Goodness-of-Fit Tests 
In this section, we analyse the predictive ability of AME Model (1), which has 
marginally more predictive ability than the second version of the model. The Hosmer-
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Lemeshow statistic reported in Table 9 suggests that the observed and expected values 
in each decile are close and the model passes the significance test at the 1% level. We 
next undertake a test of the model‟s out-of-sample predictive power.  To do this, we 
partition our sample into a period 1978-1991, and 1992-2006.  We first re-estimate 
our model using data from the period 1978-1991 only, and use this to predict 
bankruptcies in 1992.  We then roll this experiment on by one year, using 1978-92 to 
predict 1993 bankruptcies, and so on until finally the model is estimated on the basis 
of 1978-2005 data to predict 2006 bankruptcies. Table 10 then reports the forecasting 
accuracy of the in-sample and out-of-sample performance of the model.  For the in-
sample test, the model can predict 99.30% of the bankrupt firms correctly in the 5 
deciles with the highest probability of bankruptcy. Looking at the two highest 
probability deciles, the model predicts 89.7% correctly. The model reports only 
0.70% of the firms as misclassification in the lowest 5 deciles of probability, and this 
compares to 3.60% for Accounting and Market Model (1) and 3.27% for Accounting 
and Market Model (2).
5
 
 
The forecasting ability of the out-of-sample performance increases slightly to 99.55% 
for the five deciles with the highest probability of bankruptcy.  The misclassification 
for the low 5 probability deciles is 0.45%, which is lower than 2.79% for the 
Accounting and Market Model (1) and the 2.36% in Accounting and Market Model 
(2). The two highest probability deciles can predict 91.52% of the bankrupt firms 
correctly. The other AME Model (2) shows similar results, but Model (1) has the edge 
in terms of out-of-sample performance. 
 
Finally, following Ohlson (1980), in Table 11 we show that the cut-off point that 
minimises the sum of errors is .0092.  At that point, 10.30% of the bankrupt firms and 
18.11% of the non-bankrupt firms are misclassified. The expected average error rate 
would then be 14.21%.  As a comparison with the Accounting and Market Model (1), 
the Type I error drops from 16.59% to 10.30% whereas the Type II error drops from 
18.58% to 18.11%. Of course, minimising the error in this way makes the almost 
certainly wrong assumption that the cost of Type I and Type II errors is equal, and a 
                                                 
5
 Full results available from the authors on request. 
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more complex analysis of the costs and benefits of alternative error types can be 
found in Agarwal and Taffler (2008b). 
 
Prior year estimates 
In this section, we discuss logistic regression models using data from prior years. 
Previous researchers have found that bankruptcy models generally show a decline in 
accuracy for more distant bankruptcy horizons (Lennox, 1999; Campbell et al, 2008). 
We estimate the conditional probabilities of bankruptcy with a two-year and three- 
year horizon. In the logit specification, the coefficients are allowed to vary with the 
horizon of the prediction. The probability of bankruptcy in j years, conditional on 
survival in the dataset for j-1 years, is given by (Campbell et al, 2008 p. 2912 
equation [4]): 
1,2,1,1 exp1/10|1 tijjjtijtit xYYP  
The coefficients, significance levels, and overall fit of the logit regression decline as 
the horizon increases. At the two year horizon, all the variables remain statistically 
significant, but the R-squared falls to 13.35% and the area under the ROC curve to 
81.79%.  At the three year horizon, EXRET, SIGMA and LONGSHT all lose 
statistical significance, although intriguingly all the variables that embed accounting 
numbers do not.  This rather strengthens the case that Agarwal and Taffler (2008b) 
make for “unfashionable” financial statement based models as opposed to option-
based models.  Last, and fairly obviously, explanatory power falls, with R-squared 
being only 9.29% and the area under the ROC curve falling to 77.44%. 
 
Adding Industry Effects 
In the unreported tests,
6
 we find that the forecasting ability of the Accounting, Market, 
and Economic Model (AME) appears to differ across ten different industry groups. In 
this section, we follow the approach of Chava and Jarrow (2004) and test for industry 
effects by fitting the AME model with intercept and slope coefficient dummy 
variables for each industry grouping.  Initially, we conduct simple t-tests to check 
whether variables found to be significant in the AME model vary across industry 
groups.  Those tests help inform our choice on which predictor variables should be 
included in the industry model with slope-shifting dummies.  For example, it is clear 
                                                 
6
 These are unreported for space reasons, but available from the authors on request. 
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that none of the macro-economic variables or the price, market capitalisation or sigma 
variables show significant cross-sectional variation across industries.  In their 
approach, Chava and Jarrow (2004) combine the industry classifications into smaller 
groups because they suggest that their original partitioning might be too fine for 
estimation purposes. In a similar fashion, we combine the industry classifications into 
five groups. The five industry groups we select are: (1) Manufacturing: Industrials 
and Consumer Goods; (2) Services: Consumer Services, Healthcare, 
Telecommunication, Utilities; (3) Financials; (4) Technology; and (5) Oil & Gas and 
Basic Materials. 
  
Table 12 reports the results from logit regressions of the bankruptcy indicators on 
predictor variables for the AME model with the inclusion of industry effects. The 
slope dummy variables are applied to TLMTA and NIMTA in this model.
7
  The base 
case is IND1, so that dummies are capturing variation compared to the Manufacturing 
industry.  Consistent with Chava and Jarrow (2004), not all the industry variables are 
significant in the model.  TLMTA*IND2 and TLMTA*IND4 are significantly 
negative, indicating that Service and Technology industries are less exposed to 
leverage effects than manufacturing, while NIMTA*IND2 is significantly positive 
which suggests that Service industries are less vulnerable to poor profitability than 
their manufacturing counterparts.  However, the industry dummy for services (IND2) 
is positive, indicating that despite the mitigating effects with regard to profitability 
and leverage discussed above, firms in the service sector have a higher baseline 
probability of bankruptcy.  Finally, a test for the joint significance of all the industry 
and slope-shifting industry dummies confirms that we can reject the null hypothesis of 
joint insignificance. 
 
Compared to the AME model without industry effects in Table 8, the R-squared of the 
model improves from 31.37% to 32.12%, and the area under the ROC curve also 
increases from 93.40% to 93.58%.  A likelihood ratio test between the Constrained 
and Unconstrained Model indicates that the industry effect is significant at the 1% 
level.  In Table 13 we show that the model provides a modest improvement in both its 
                                                 
7
 Note that we also estimate industry versions of the Accounting, and Accounting and Market models, 
not reported here as they are dominated by the AME model.  In those models, the significant slope-
shifting dummies on the predictor variables vary.  Full results are available from the authors on request.  
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in sample and its out-of-sample forecasting ability compared to the model without the 
industry variables. Comparing the results in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 13 the in-
sample performance increases by 0.81% in the high probability decile and 0.56% in 
the highest 2 deciles. The misclassification error in the highest probability 5 deciles 
decreases from 0.70% to 0.65%. With respect to the out-of-sample performance, the 
predictive ability in the highest decile increases by 1.13% and by 0.96% in the highest 
2 deciles.  The overall predictive ability in the five high probability of bankruptcy 
deciles increases by 0.13%. 
 
In unreported tests, we investigate whether industry effects improve the performance 
of the Accounting and Market, and the pure Accounting model.  Both the in-sample 
estimation and out-of-sample prediction of all three models confirm the importance of 
industry effects. For prediction based on the AME Model and A&M Model, the 
industry effects appear to be relatively marginal, almost certainly due to the inclusion 
of the market and economic variables. However, industry effects appear to be more 
important in the pure Accounting Model.  For that reason, for the benefit of those 
researchers who are interested in models based purely on financial statements we 
present the model with industry effects in the Appendix. 
 
Conclusion 
Recent evidence in Agarwal and Taffler (2008b) highlight the fact that accounting-
based models have an important role to play in the prediction of financial distress.  
They note that whilst accounting ratio based models are much criticised for a lack of 
theoretical grounding, they are capable of out-performing their more theoretically 
appealing contingent-claims based alternatives.  They point out three factors that 
might favour accounting models: first, corporate failure is likely to evolve over time 
and as such will be reflected in financial statements; second, the nature of double 
entry bookkeeping means that combining accounting information should overcome 
the effects of policy changes or “window dressing”;8 third, loan covenants are 
generally based on accounting numbers.  It is interesting to note that this latter point is 
timely in relation to the current credit and economic crisis, whilst the first point is 
consistent with our evidence on prior year bankruptcy prediction.   
                                                 
8
 Conceptually, this is not dissimilar to the arguments advanced for residual income valuation models 
with clean surplus accounting. 
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Agarwal and Taffler (2008a, 2008b) obtain their results using a long-established 
simple z-score model, and this underpins the logit model they estimate in Agarwal 
and Taffler (2007).  However, there is evidence from Shumway (2001) and Chava and 
Jarrow (2004) that a “hazard” or “dynamic logit” model can considerably improve the 
predictive power of simpler models.  Most recently, Campbell et al (2008) show that 
market variables might further add to the power of “traditional” prediction models.  
Last, Chava and Jarrow (2004) show that industry effects can add power to such 
models.  Yet to our knowledge, no published papers have attempted to apply such 
enhancements to the problem of bankruptcy prediction in the UK.  This seems an 
important shortcoming, in at least three respects.  First, it is unfortunate that the 
current economic environment has undoubtedly revived interest in financial distress 
prediction models.  Second, recent work by Campbell et al (2008) shows that 
financially distressed firms deliver anomalously low returns.  Unfortunately, without 
better distress prediction models we cannot be sure that this result holds in the UK, 
although Agarwal and Taffler (2008a) provide some interesting evidence in this 
regard.  Last, Pope (2010) has raised the importance of financial distress indicators in 
the context of the asset pricing literature.  To this end, well-specified models of 
financial distress would give a potentially useful input to new factor and portfolio 
construction. 
 
These observations provide a strong motivation for a comprehensive re-visiting of 
bankruptcy prediction in the UK.  Employing the Shumway (2001) and Chava and 
Jarrow (2004) “dynamic logit” model, we provide Accounting and Accounting and 
Market models for the UK.  Following the logic of Campbell et al (2008), we extend 
their model by investigating the importance of macro-economic variables. We find 
that the risk free rate of interest, the term structure of interest rates, and an inflation 
term are significant variables in improving the basic Accounting and Market model of 
Campbell et al (2008).  Extending the analysis further, by adding an industry effect as 
in Chava and Jarrow (2004) marginally increases the power of this model.  However, 
industry effects seem more important in the context of a pure accounting model. 
 
We do not interpret our results as in any way undermining the importance of 
accounting data.  Rather, we see the results as emphasising the importance of 
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combining accounting and market information.  To a degree, this can be viewed as 
providing support for Pope‟s (2010) argument that accounting numbers can be 
informative about a firm‟s fundamental risk attributes.   Our interpretation is in a 
similar sprit to that of Beaver et al (2005, p.112) who note  "market-based variables 
are not a substitute for the accounting-based information but rather a proxy for the 
predictive power attainable by capturing the total mix of information, including both 
the financial statement and non-financial statement information."  Three messages 
stand out for accounting research from our findings.  The first is that financial 
statement information on profitability, cash flow and liabilities retain an important 
role in predicting distress even in the presence of market variables.  Beaver et al 
(2005, p.115) argue that market-based variables do not distinguish between volatilities 
induced by business risk and financial risks, and our results are consistent with that 
claim.  The second is that replacing accounting measures of book value with market 
measures in financial ratio denominators improves predictive power by making that 
information more timely.  The third is that at longer forecasting horizons, it is only 
those variables that embed accounting information that retain any ability to predict 
financial distress.    
 
Of course, as with any model of this type, we remain open to the accusation of “data 
mining”.  However, we note that we have been careful only to investigate those 
variables that have been found important in previous models, and many of these have 
been formulated outside the UK.  Second, we have taken great care to validate our 
model by subjecting it to out-of-sample testing.  Doing so reveals that the 
performance of the AME model in particular remains impressive. 
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Table 1: Categories of Liquidation, Suspension and Receivership 
(“Bankruptcies”) 
Code Reasons LSPD 
G10 
# of 
Bankruptcies 
% of 
Bankruptcies 
1 Suspension 6 10 1.70% 
2 Liquidation 7 90 15.28% 
3 Quotation suspended 10 24 4.07% 
4 Voluntary Liquidation 11 36 6.11% 
5 Receiver appointed 16 130 22.07% 
6 In Administration 20 222 37.69% 
7 Cancelled & assumed 
valueless 
21 77 13.07% 
 Total All 589 100% 
 
The table shows type of liquidation, suspension and receivership by LSPD Death 
Marker code, 1978-2006. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Accounting Model Predictor Variables 
 
Variable WCTA TLTA CFTA CHIN INTWO EBITSHARE QACA FOPTL 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Mean 0.169 0.479 0.051 0.039 0.111 0.152 0.702 0.172 
Median 0.152 0.479 0.056 0.071 0.000 0.154 0.700 0.193 
St. Dev 0.215 0.203 0.128 0.481 0.314 0.293 0.235 0.366 
Min -0.211 0.103 -0.286 -1.000 0.000 -0.588 0.246 -0.882 
Max 0.621 0.885 0.267 1.000 1.000 0.767 1.000 0.810 
Panel B: Bankrupt Group 
Mean 0.071 0.618 -0.043 -0.255 0.288 -0.006 0.702 -0.141 
Median 0.039 0.663 -0.019 -0.248 0.000 0.013 0.729 -0.041 
St. Dev 0.242 0.233 0.154 0.604 0.453 0.435 0.252 0.380 
Panel C: Non-Bankrupt Group 
Mean 0.170 0.477 0.052 0.042 0.109 0.154 0.702 0.176 
Median 0.153 0.478 0.057 0.073 0.000 0.156 0.700 0.195 
St. Dev 0.215 0.202 0.127 0.478 0.312 0.291 0.234 0.364 
Panel D: Acquired Firms Group 
Mean 0.167 0.477 0.078 0.052 0.061 0.178 0.656 0.247 
Median 0.156 0.479 0.082 0.080 0.000 0.164 0.641 0.228 
St. Dev 0.196 0.179 0.106 0.452 0.239 0.240 0.228 0.295 
 
This table shows mean, median and standard deviation for the following variables: 
working capital over total assets (WCTA), total liabilities over total assets (TLTA), 
cash flow over total assets (CFTA), change in net income (CHIN), one if net income 
was negative for the last two years (INTWO), earnings before interest and tax over 
share capital (EBITSHARE), quick assets over current assets (QACA), and funds 
from operation over total liabilities (FOPTL). Panel A reports summary statistics for 
all firm observations, panels B and C report summary statistics for the bankrupt and 
non-bankrupt groups respectively, and panel D reports summary statistics for the 
acquired firms group (the censored component of the non-bankrupt firms). 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Accounting & Market Model Predictor 
Variables 
Variable TLME EXRET CFMTA SIGMA PRICE NIMTA TLTADJ RSIZE 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Mean 1.016 -0.022 0.046 0.135 1.554 0.021 0.495 -2.920 
Median 0.598 -0.011 0.046 0.097 0.980 0.034 0.495 -3.064 
St. Dev 1.121 0.123 0.081 0.114 1.619 0.060 0.233 1.831 
Min 0.047 -0.341 -0.139 0.029 0.010 -0.152 0.048 -5.952 
Max 4.327 0.185 0.200 0.472 5.860 0.100 0.975 0.721 
Panel B: Bankrupt Group 
Mean 2.542 -0.145 -0.013 0.255 0.240 -0.056 0.611 -4.789 
Median 2.797 -0.149 -0.016 0.223 0.070 -0.059 0.648 -5.117 
St. Dev 1.686 0.180 0.109 0.157 0.517 0.085 0.269 1.236 
Panel C: Non-Bankrupt Group 
Mean 0.999 -0.021 0.046 0.133 1.571 0.022 0.493 -2.899 
Median 0.591 -0.011 0.047 0.096 1.000 0.035 0.493 -3.042 
St. Dev 1.101 0.122 0.081 0.113 1.621 0.059 0.232 1.826 
Panel D: Acquired Firms Group 
Mean 1.060 -0.015 0.063 0.120 1.535 0.033 0.498 -2.646 
Median 0.654 -0.008 0.065 0.092 1.050 0.039 0.496 -2.786 
St. Dev 1.105 0.112 0.075 0.098 1.487 0.048 0.206 1.625 
This table shows mean, median and standard deviation for the following variables: 
total liabilities over market value of equity (TLME), log excess return over  FTSE All 
Share Index (EXRET), cash flow over market value of total assets calculated by 
addition of firm market value and book value of total liabilities (CFMTA),  standard 
deviation of firm stock returns over a six-month period (SIGMA), price per share 
(PRICE), net income over market value of total assets (NIMTA), total liabilities over 
adjusted total assets calculated by adding 10% of the difference between market 
equity and book equity (TLTADJ), and log of firm‟s market equity over the total 
valuation of FTSE All Share Index (RSIZE). Panel A reports summary statistics for 
all firm observations, panels B and C report summary statistics for the bankrupt and 
non-bankrupt groups respectively, and panel D reports summary statistics for the 
acquired firms group (the censored component of the non-bankrupt firms). 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for Accounting, Market, and Economic Model 
Predictor Variables 
 
Variable TLMTA NIMTA CFMTA EXRET SIGMA PRICE RSIZE LONGSHT TBR INFL 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Mean 0.399 0.021 0.046 -0.022 0.135 1.555 -2.920 0.123 8.170 0.446 
Median 0.378 0.034 0.047 -0.011 0.097 0.980 -3.064 -0.040 7.020 0.444 
St. Dev 0.230 0.060 0.081 0.123 0.114 1.619 1.831 1.992 3.560 0.215 
Min 0.046 -0.152 -0.139 -0.341 0.029 0.010 -5.952 -4.830 3.590 -0.061 
Max 0.836 0.100 0.200 0.185 0.472 5.860 0.721 6.510 15.720 0.991 
Panel B: Bankrupt Group 
Mean 0.654 -0.060 -0.014 -0.152 0.261 0.165 -4.905 -0.253 8.374 0.490 
Median 0.784 -0.064 -0.023 -0.165 0.232 0.060 -5.168 -0.190 7.020 0.452 
St. Dev 0.244 0.084 0.110 0.181 0.156 0.293 1.104 1.740 4.040 0.228 
Panel C: Non-Bankrupt Group 
Mean 0.396 0.022 0.046 -0.021 0.133 1.571 -2.898 0.127 8.168 0.446 
Median 0.375 0.035 0.047 -0.011 0.096 1.000 -3.040 -0.040 7.020 0.444 
St. Dev 0.229 0.059 0.081 0.122 0.113 1.621 1.826 1.995 3.555 0.215 
Panel D: Acquired Firms Group 
Mean 0.418 0.033 0.063 -0.015 0.120 1.535 -2.645 0.182 9.188 0.444 
Median 0.400 0.039 0.065 -0.008 0.092 1.050 -2.786 -0.040 9.380 0.444 
St. Dev 0.219 0.048 0.075 0.112 0.098 1.487 1.625 2.203 3.456 0.237 
 
This table shows mean, median and standard deviation for the following variables: 
total liabilities over market value of assets (TLMTA), net income over market value 
of total assets (NIMTA), cash flow over market value of total assets (CFMTA),  log 
excess return over  FTSE All Share Index (EXRET),   standard deviation of firm stock 
returns over a six-month period (SIGMA), price per share (PRICE), log of firm‟s 
market equity over the total valuation of FTSE All Share Index (RSIZE), the term 
structure premium – the difference between long-term guilt rate and Treasury Bill 
Rate (LONGSHT),  the three month Treasury Bill Rate (TBR), and the monthly RPI 
inflation rate (INFL). Panel A reports summary statistics for all firm observations, 
panels B and C report summary statistics for the bankrupt and non-bankrupt groups 
respectively, and panel D reports summary statistics for the acquired firms group (the 
censored component of the non-bankrupt firms). 
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Table 5: Logit Regressions of Bankruptcy Indicator on Accounting Model 
Predictor Variables 
 
Variable Coefficient & z-value 
WCTA -0.707 
 (2.94)*** 
TLTA 2.746 
 (10.99)*** 
CFTA -2.168 
 (5.44)*** 
CHIN -0.743 
 (8.22)*** 
INTWO 0.511 
 (4.27)*** 
EBITSHARE -0.613 
 (5.25)*** 
QACA -0.946 
 (5.08)*** 
FOPTL -0.703 
 (4.01)*** 
Constant -5.143 
 (22.66)*** 
Number of bankruptcies 558 
Firm-year Observations 41545 
Number of firms 4454 
Likelihood Ratio χ2 753.34*** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1273 
Area under the ROC curve 0.8124 
 
This table reports results from logit regressions of the bankruptcy indicator on the 
following variables: working capital over total assets (WCTA), total liabilities over 
total assets (TLTA), cash flow over total assets (CFTA), change in net income 
(CHIN), one if net income was negative for the last two years (INTWO), earnings 
before interest and tax over share capital (EBITSHARE), quick assets over current 
assets (QACA), and funds from operation over total liabilities (FOPTL). The absolute 
value of the z-statistics is reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% 
level, **denotes significance at the 5% level and ***denotes significance at the 1% 
level. 
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Table 6: Logit Regressions of Bankruptcy Indicator on Accounting and Market 
Predictor Variables 
 
Variable Coefficient & z-
value 
 Variable Coefficient & z-
value 
Accounting & Market 
Model (1) 
 Accounting & Market 
Model (2) 
TLME 0.479  WCMTA -0.934 
 (13.83)***         (3.60)*** 
EXRET -2.707  EXRET -2.66 
 (8.70)***         (8.56)*** 
CFMTA -2.765  CFMTA -3.069 
 (4.60)***         (5.05)*** 
SIGMA 1.757  SIGMA 1.984 
 (4.70)***         (5.27)*** 
PRICE -0.008  PRICE -0.009 
 (6.10)***         (6.08)*** 
NIMTA -3.156  NIMTA -3.226 
 (4.00)***         (4.06)*** 
TLTADJ 0.681  TLMTA 2.947 
 (3.24)***       (11.38)*** 
RSIZE -0.121  RSIZE -0.116 
 (2.54)**           (2.43)** 
Constant -6.102  BM 0.155 
 (22.11)***         (2.61)*** 
   Constant -6.474 
        (22.19)*** 
Number of 
bankruptcies 
428  Number of 
bankruptcies 
428 
Firm-year 
Observations 
39960  Firm-year 
Observations 
39960 
Number of firms 4565  Number of firms 4565 
Likelihood Ratio χ2 1199.50***  Likelihood Ratio χ2 1180.60*** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2533  Pseudo R-squared 0.2494 
Area under the ROC 
curve 
0.8992  Area under the ROC 
curve 
0.8961 
This table reports results from logit regressions of the bankruptcy indicator on the 
following variables: total liabilities over market value of equity (TLME), log excess 
return over  FTSE All Share Index (EXRET), cash flow over market value of total 
assets calculated by addition of firm market value and book value of total liabilities 
(CFMTA),  standard deviation of firm stock returns over a six-month period 
(SIGMA), price per share (PRICE), net income over market value of total assets 
(NIMTA), total liabilities over adjusted total assets calculated by adding 10% of the 
difference between market equity and book equity (TLTADJ), and log of firm‟s 
market equity over the total valuation of FTSE All Share Index (RSIZE). The absolute 
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value of the z-statistics is reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% 
level, **denotes significance at the 5% level and ***denotes significance at the 1% 
level. 
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Table 7: Logit Regressions of Bankruptcy Indicator on Accounting, Market and 
Economic Predictor Variables  
Variable Coefficient 
& z-value 
 Variable Coefficient 
& z-value 
 Variable Coefficient 
& z-value 
Accounting & Market 
Model 
 Accounting & Market & 
 Economic Model (1) 
 Accounting & Market & 
 Economic Model (2) 
TLME 0.479  TLMTA 3.149  TLMTA 3.325 
 (13.83)***   (13.22)***   (14.34)*** 
EXRET -2.707  EXRET -2.705  EXRET -2.560 
 (8.70)***   (8.61)***   (8.21)*** 
CFMTA -2.765  CFMTA -2.444  CFMTA -2.449 
 (4.60)***   (4.10)***   (4.10)*** 
SIGMA 1.757  SIGMA 2.132  SIGMA 2.084 
 (4.70)***   (5.55)***   (5.46)*** 
PRICE -0.008  PRICE -0.008  PRICE -0.009 
 (6.10)***   (5.71)***   (6.06)*** 
NIMTA -3.156  NIMTA -5.024  NIMTA -4.832 
 (4.00)***   (6.35)***   (6.10)*** 
TLTADJ 0.681  RSIZE -0.185  RSIZE -0.143 
 (3.24)***   (3.52)***   (2.85)*** 
RSIZE -0.121  LONGSHT -0.117  LONGSHT -0.207 
 (2.54)**   (2.55)**   (6.03)*** 
Constant -6.102  TBR 0.068  DEFLTBR 0.0310 
 (22.11)***   (3.39)***   (1.90)* 
   INFL 0.588   INDPROD -0.252 
    (2.12)**   (2.83)*** 
   Constant -7.759  Constant -6.839 
    (19.84)***   (22.37)*** 
Number of 
bankruptcies 
428  Number of 
bankruptcies 
428  Number of 
bankruptcies 
428 
Firm-year 
Observations 
39960  Firm-year 
Observations 
39960  Firm-year 
Observations 
39960 
Number of 
firms 
4565  Number of 
firms 
4565  Number of 
firms 
4565 
Likelihood 
Ratio χ2 
1199.50***  Likelihood 
Ratio χ2 
1241.23***  Likelihood 
Ratio χ2 
1234.17*** 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.2533  Pseudo R-
squared 
0.2622  Pseudo R-
squared 
0.2607 
Area under the 
ROC curve 
0.8992  Area under the 
ROC curve 
0.9034  Area under the 
ROC curve 
0.9029 
This table reports results from logit regressions of the bankruptcy indicator on the 
following variables: total liabilities over market value of equity (TLME), log excess 
return over  FTSE All Share Index (EXRET), cash flow over market value of total 
assets calculated by addition of firm market value and book value of total liabilities 
(CFMTA),  standard deviation of firm stock returns over a six-month period 
(SIGMA), price per share (PRICE), net income over market value of total assets 
(NIMTA), total liabilities over adjusted total assets calculated by adding 10% of the 
difference between market equity and book equity (TLTADJ), log of firm‟s market 
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equity over the total valuation of FTSE All Share Index (RSIZE), ), the term structure 
premium – the difference between long-term guilt rate and Treasury Bill Rate 
(LONGSHT),  the three month Treasury Bill Rate (TBR), and the monthly RPI 
inflation rate (INFL). The absolute value of the z-statistics is reported in parentheses. 
* denotes significance at the 10% level, **denotes significance at the 5% level and 
***denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 8: Logit Regressions of Bankruptcy Indicator on Predictor Variables with 
influential observations deleted 
Variable Coefficient 
& z-value 
 Variable Coefficient 
& z-value 
 Variable Coefficient 
& z-value 
Accounting & Market 
Model 
 Accounting & Market & 
 Economic Model (1) 
 Accounting & Market & 
 Economic Model (2) 
TLME 0.503  TLMTA 3.468  TLMTA 3.664 
 (13.97)***   (13.46)***   (14.60)*** 
EXRET -2.661  EXRET -2.656  EXRET -2.509 
 (8.35)***   (8.25)***   (7.86)*** 
CFMTA -2.656  CFMTA -2.406  CFMTA -2.395 
 (4.32)***   (3.95)***   (3.92)*** 
SIGMA 1.637  SIGMA 2.032  SIGMA 1.979 
 (4.22)***   (5.08)***   (4.99)*** 
PRICE -0.019  PRICE -0.019  PRICE -0.020 
 (7.96)***   (7.82)***   (8.08)*** 
NIMTA -2.571  NIMTA -4.496  NIMTA -4.308 
 (3.17)***   (5.52)***   (5.29)*** 
TLTADJ 0.668  RSIZE -0.181  RSIZE -0.130 
 (3.06)***   (3.09)***   (2.34)** 
RSIZE -0.097  LONGSHT -0.130  LONGSHT -0.231 
 (1.88)*   (2.68)***   (6.36)*** 
Constant -5.798  TBR 0.081  DEFLTBR 0.040 
 (18.95)***   (3.85)***   (2.33)** 
   INFL 0.532  INDPROD -0.255 
    (1.84)*   (2.71)*** 
   Constant -7.765  Constant -6.757 
    (17.89)**   (19.66)*** 
Number of 
bankruptcies 
398  Number of 
bankruptcies 
398  Number of 
bankruptcies 
398 
Firm-year 
Observations 
39925  Firm-year 
Observations 
39925  Firm-year 
Observations 
39925 
Number of 
firms 
4562  Number of 
firms 
4562  Number of 
firms 
4562 
Likelihood 
Ratio χ2 
1335.11***  Likelihood 
Ratio χ2 
1399.07***  Likelihood 
Ratio χ2 
1390.18*** 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.2993  Pseudo R-
squared 
0.3137  Pseudo R-
squared 
0.3117 
Area under the 
ROC curve 
0.9283  Area under the 
ROC curve 
0.9340  Area under the 
ROC curve 
0.9332 
 
This table reports results from logit regressions of the bankruptcy indicator on the 
following variables with influential observations deleted: total liabilities over market 
value of equity (TLME), log excess return over  FTSE All Share Index (EXRET), 
cash flow over market value of total assets calculated by addition of firm market value 
and book value of total liabilities (CFMTA),  standard deviation of firm stock returns 
over a six-month period (SIGMA), price per share (PRICE), net income over market 
value of total assets (NIMTA), total liabilities over adjusted total assets calculated by 
adding 10% of the difference between market equity and book equity (TLTADJ), log 
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of firm‟s market equity over the total valuation of FTSE All Share Index (RSIZE), the 
term structure premium – the difference between long-term guilt rate and Treasury 
Bill Rate (LONGSHT),  the three month Treasury Bill Rate (TBR), and the monthly 
RPI inflation rate (INFL). The absolute value of the z-statistics is reported in 
parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, **denotes significance at the 5% 
level and ***denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 9: Hosmer-Lemeshow Statistic for the Accounting, Market and Economic 
Model 
Group N Obs (%) Exp (%) HL 
1 3993 0 0 0 0 0 
2 3993 0 0 0 0 0 
3 3992 0 0 0.2 0 0.2 
4 3993 0 0 0.7 0 0.7 
5 3992 0 0 2 0 2 
6 3993 1 0 4.8 0.1 3 
7 3993 13 0.3 10.5 0.3 0.6 
8 3992 24 0.6 22.9 0.6 0.1 
9 3993 60 1.5 55.5 1.4 0.4 
10 3992 300 7.5 301.5 7.6 0 
Total 39926 398 1 398 1 6.8 
Number of observations  39925   
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2  6.80   
Prob > 
chi2 
   0.5579   
 
The table reports the goodness-of-fit of the Accounting, Market and Economic Model 
(1) from Table 8 as measured by the Hosmer-Lemeshow (2000) statistic. 
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Table 10:  In-Sample and Out-of-Sample Forecast Accuracy of Accounting, 
Market and Economic Model (1) 
   
Group In-sample Out-of-Sample 
1 0.00% 0.00% 
2 0.00% 0.00% 
3 0.02% 0.00% 
4 0.18% 0.12% 
5 0.50% 0.33% 
6 1.21% 0.91% 
7 2.64% 2.18% 
8 5.75% 4.94% 
9 13.94% 12.89% 
10 75.75% 78.63% 
6 to 10 99.30% 99.55% 
 
For the in-sample test, the Accounting, Market and Economic Model (1) from Table 8 
is used to estimate the forecast bankruptcy probabilities with data from 1978-2006. 
The probabilities are calculated for each year and the companies are then grouped into 
deciles based on the default probabilities. The number of bankruptcies in each decile 
for each year are aggregated over 1978-2006 and reported in the table. For the out-of-
sample test, the model is initially estimated with data from 1978-1991 and used to 
forecast bankruptcy probabilities for 1992-2006. This process is then rolled on 
annually.  The probabilities are calculated for each year and the companies are 
grouped into deciles based on the default probabilities. The number of bankruptcies in 
each decile for each year are aggregated over 1992-2006 and reported in the table. 
Group 1 represent firms with low predicted bankrupt probabilities; Group 10 
represents firms with high predicted bankrupt probabilities. 
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Table 11: Type I and Type II Errors of Accounting, Market, and Economic 
model 
 
Probability True signal False Signal Average Overall 
 Cutpoint  Sensitivity  Specificity Type I Type II error accuracy 
0.005 94.47% 74.26% 5.53% 25.74% 15.64% 74.46% 
0.006 93.72% 76.67% 6.28% 23.33% 14.81% 76.84% 
0.007 92.96% 78.59% 7.04% 21.41% 14.23% 78.74% 
0.008 90.70% 80.22% 9.30% 19.78% 14.54% 80.32% 
0.009 89.70% 81.62% 10.30% 18.38% 14.34% 81.70% 
0.0091 89.70% 81.75% 10.30% 18.25% 14.28% 81.83% 
0.0092 89.70% 81.89% 10.30% 18.11% 14.21% 81.97% 
0.0093 89.45% 82.02% 10.55% 17.98% 14.27% 82.09% 
0.0094 88.94% 82.15% 11.06% 17.85% 14.46% 82.22% 
0.0095 88.44% 82.32% 11.56% 17.68% 14.62% 82.38% 
0.01 88.19% 82.93% 11.81% 17.07% 14.44% 82.98% 
0.015 82.91% 87.07% 17.09% 12.93% 15.01% 87.03% 
0.02 77.14% 89.50% 22.86% 10.50% 16.68% 89.38% 
0.025 73.87% 91.36% 26.13% 8.64% 17.39% 91.19% 
0.03 70.35% 92.60% 29.65% 7.40% 18.53% 92.37% 
0.04 65.58% 94.47% 34.42% 5.53% 19.98% 94.19% 
0.05 61.06% 95.54% 38.94% 4.46% 21.70% 95.19% 
0.10 38.44% 98.29% 61.56% 1.71% 31.64% 97.69% 
0.20 16.08% 99.50% 83.92% 0.50% 42.21% 98.67% 
0.30 6.28% 99.84% 93.72% 0.16% 46.94% 98.91% 
0.40 2.01% 99.97% 97.99% 0.03% 49.01% 98.99% 
0.50 0.25% 100.00% 99.75% 0.00% 49.88% 99.01% 
0.60 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 50.00% 99.00% 
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Table 12: Accounting, Market and Economic Model, with Industry Effects 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant -8.00 (15.90)*** 
TLMTA 4.163 (9.65)*** 
EXRET -2.699 (8.34)*** 
CFMTA -2.711 (4.36)*** 
SIGMA 2.032 (5.06)*** 
PRICE -0.019 (7.75)*** 
NIMTA -5.654 (5.56)*** 
RSIZE -0.167 (2.84)*** 
LONGSHT -0.145 (3.00)*** 
TBR 0.065 (3.04)*** 
INFL 0.637 (2.18)** 
IND2 0.892 (2.17)** 
IND3 0.239 (0.41) 
IND4 0.636 (1.02) 
IND5 0.048 (0.07) 
TLMTA*IND2 -1.333 (2.21)** 
TLMTA*IND3 -0.837 (1.04) 
TLMTA*IND4 -2.628 (2.73)*** 
TLMTA*IND5 -1.731 (1.49) 
NIMTA*IND2 3.925 (2.53)** 
NIMTA*IND3 1.442 (0.65) 
NIMTA*IND4 -0.987 (0.31) 
NIMTA*IND5 -1.927 (0.44) 
Number of bankruptcies 398  
Firm-year Observations 39925  
Number of firms 4562  
Likelihood Ratio χ2 1432.6**  
Pseudo R-squared 0.3212  
Area under the ROC curve 0.9358   
 
This table reports results from logit regressions of the bankruptcy indicators on the 
following variables with influential observations deleted: total liabilities over market 
value of equity (TLME), log excess return over  FTSE All Share Index (EXRET), 
cash flow over market value of total assets calculated by addition of firm market value 
and book value of total liabilities (CFMTA),  standard deviation of firm stock returns 
over a six-month period (SIGMA), price per share (PRICE), net income over market 
value of total assets (NIMTA), total liabilities over adjusted total assets calculated by 
adding 10% of the difference between market equity and book equity (TLTADJ), log 
of firm‟s market equity over the total valuation of FTSE All Share Index (RSIZE),  
the term structure premium – the difference between long-term guilt rate and Treasury 
Bill Rate (LONGSHT),  the three month Treasury Bill Rate (TBR), and the monthly 
RPI inflation rate (INFL). The five industry groups, represented by dummy variables 
are: IND1 - Manufacturing: Industrials and Consumer Goods (the base case); IND2 - 
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Services: Consumer Services, Healthcare, Telecommunication, Utilities; IND3 - 
Financials; IND4 - Technology; and IND5 - Oil & Gas and Basic Materials. 
 The absolute value of the z-statistics is reported in parentheses. * denotes 
significance at the 10% level, **denotes significance at the 5% level and ***denotes 
significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 13: Forecast Accuracy of in-sample and out-of-sample performance with 
Industry Effects 
 
For the in-sample test, the model estimated the forecast bankruptcy probabilities with 
data from 1978-2006. The probabilities are calculated for each year and the 
companies are then grouped into deciles based on the default probabilities. The 
number of bankruptcies in each decile for each year are aggregated over 1978-2006 
and reported in the table. For the out-of-sample test, the model estimated with data 
from 1978-1991 with yearly observation intervals is used to forecast bankruptcy 
probabilities for 1992-2006. This process is then rolled on annually. The probabilities 
are calculated for each year and the companies are then grouped into deciles based on 
the default probabilities. The number of bankruptcies in each decile for each year are 
aggregated over 1992-2006 and reported in the table. Group 1 represent firms with 
low predicted bankrupt probabilities; Group 10 represents firms with high predicted 
bankrupt probabilities. 
 
 In-Sample Out-of-Sample 
Group No 
Industry 
Effects 
With 
Industry 
Effects 
No 
Industry 
Effects 
With 
Industry 
Effects 
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 
4 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.07 
5 0.50 0.45 0.33 0.25 
6 1.21 1.11 0.91 0.72 
7 2.64 2.49 2.18 1.87 
8 5.75 5.50 4.94 4.60 
9 13.94 13.69 12.89 12.72 
10 75.75 76.56 78.63 79.76 
6 to 10 99.30 99.35 99.55 99.68 
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Appendix: Pure Accounting Model With Industry Effects 
 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant -5.603 (18.43)*** 
TLTA 3.730 (9.64)*** 
WCTA -1.065 (4.09)*** 
CFTA -2.131 (4.30)*** 
CHIN -0.758 (8.12)*** 
INTWO 0.543 (4.40)*** 
EBITSHARE -0.639 (5.30)*** 
QACA -0.916 (4.64)*** 
FOPTL -0.728 (3.88)*** 
   
   
IND2 0.638 (1.82)* 
IND3 0.225 (0.46) 
IND4 0.307 (0.51) 
IND5 0.684 (1.33) 
TLTA*IND2 -1.774 (3.35)*** 
TLTA*IND3 -0.663 (0.92) 
TLTA*IND4 -3.290 (4.24)*** 
TLTA*IND5 -2.649 (2.76)*** 
CFTA*IND2 -0.206 (0.29) 
CFTA*IND3 0.521 (0.50) 
CFTA*IND4 -4.670 (2.67)*** 
CFTA*IND5 0.206 (0.13) 
Number of bankruptcies 531  
Firm-year Observations 41513  
Number of firms 4454  
Likelihood Ratio χ2 855.62**  
Pseudo R-squared 0.1505  
Area under the ROC curve 0.8331   
 
This table reports results from logit regressions of the bankruptcy indicators on the 
following variables: working capital over total assets (WCTA), total liabilities over 
total assets (TLTA), cash flow over total assets (CFTA), change in net income 
(CHIN), one if net income was negative for the last two years (INTWO), earnings 
before interest and tax over share capital (EBITSHARE), quick assets over current 
assets (QACA), and funds from operation over total liabilities (FOPTL). The five 
industry groups, represented by dummy variables are: IND1 - Manufacturing: 
Industrials and Consumer Goods (the base case); IND2 - Services: Consumer 
Services, Healthcare, Telecommunication, Utilities; IND3 - Financials; IND4 - 
Technology; and IND5 - Oil & Gas and Basic Materials. The absolute value of the z-
statistics is reported in parentheses. * denotes significance at the 10% level, **denotes 
significance at the 5% level and ***denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
